A Study of Tort Liability for Negligence Applied to Guidance and Student Personnel Workers by Kuzlik, Therese M.
Eastern Illinois University
The Keep
Masters Theses Student Theses & Publications
1970
A Study of Tort Liability for Negligence Applied to
Guidance and Student Personnel Workers
Therese M. Kuzlik
Eastern Illinois University
This research is a product of the graduate program in Educational Psychology and Guidance at Eastern Illinois
University. Find out more about the program.
This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses
by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kuzlik, Therese M., "A Study of Tort Liability for Negligence Applied to Guidance and Student Personnel Workers" (1970). Masters
Theses. 4013.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/4013
PAPER CERTIFICATE "'.�2 
TO: Graduate Degree Candidates who have written formal theses. 
SUBJECT: Permission to reproduce theses. 
The University Library is rece1v1ng a number of requests from other 
institutions asking permission to reproduce dissertations for inclusion 
in their library holdings. Although no copyright laws are involved, 
we feel that professional courtesy demands that permission be obtained 
from the author before we allow theses to be copied. 
Please sign one of the following statements. 
Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to 
lend my thesis to a reputable college or university for the purpose 
of copying it for inclusion in that institution's library or research 
holdings. 
1- I -to 
Date Author 
I respectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University not 
allow my thesis be reproduced because 
�����������������
Date Author 
/L81861.C57XK978>C2/ 
A STJTDY OF TOBT I.I ABTI.TTY FOR NEGI.IGENCE 
APPI.IED TO GUIDANCE AND S'MIDENT PERSoNNET. WORKERS 
(TITLE) 
BY 
'l'herese M. Kuzli.k 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
Master of Sc1ence 1n Educat1nn 
IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS 
<1970 
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE.ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING 
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE 
7 -7 /� 
� 
DATE ADVISER 
·--; / ---;t ,.. .. 
'-
•. 
DATE -DEPARTMENT HEAD 
A STUDY OP TORT LIABILIT'l FC� 
NEGLIGENCE APPLIED TO GUIDANCE 
AND STUDENT PERSONNEL WORKERS 
PREFACI 
Just a rapid glance at the number ot law schools and 
law libraries, the work of our state and federal legisla­
tures, the lengthy listings in the telephone directories 
of any large city under the heading "Lawyers ," and the 
backlog or cases pending hearing on the court dockets 
demonstrates that ours is a legally oriented society. In 
spite of all thia, the area or legal responsibility or 
school guidance and student personnel workers is an area 
that until recent years has been given ve17 little con­
s ideration by school personnel. It 1a an area that is 
uncertain, continually vacillating, and one that has very 
little legal precedent. 
'l'he legal aspects of counseling and personnel services 
cover a wide field which includes confidentiality, record 
keeping, diaaeminating student information, libel and 
slander, search ot student rooma, accessory before the 
fact, acceaaory after the fact, and negligence. Because 
of the extent of each of theae topics it will be necessary 
to delimit this study to tort liability of school employee s ,  
especially guidance and student personnel workers, tor 
negligence. 
It ia the purpose of this report to establish guidance 
and student personnel work aa a profession, to survey the 
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history and structure of negligence and tort liability 
for negligence as used in the courts of law, to show 
the effect of negligence and liability on other professions -
medicine, law, theology, accounting - and to parallel this 
to the counseling profession. The writer is aware that 
this does not represent any existing law and is certainly not 
attempting to provide the legal defense for a hypothetical 
or test case, for only a properly cert ified attorne1 can do 
this. Rather this is an endeavor to explore in length an 
area that 1a of interest to the writer and should be of 
interest to all guidance and student personnel workers, as 
well as other school employees, making them aware of the 
fact that some of their actions may have legal repercussions . 
It is also an attempt to promote concern over the leaal 
problems of the profession, thus cultivating a better 
understanding of the legal implications of counseling. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTBODUCTION 
•Historically, the term guidance hes been used in 
the field or education to designate the assistance given 
to students in the solution or problems that lay outside 
the area or classroom teaching a1tuat1ona."1 For the 
purpose of this paper guidance workers can beat be defined 
as those proteaaionally trained individuals engaged in 
the field or education whoa• a id is enlisted by others to 
help them to understand themaelvea, to adJuat to their 
environment, and to make their own dec1a1ona. This �roup 
includea members ot counseling centers and special clinics , 
such aa, reading, speech and hearing, and study skills. 
student personnel workers are those involved on the high 
school or college level in special student services out­
s ide the academic field, more apec1t1call7, housing and 
rood aervioea, atudent activities , health aervicea, and 
student d1ac1pl1ne. Also included among this group are 
those engaged in auch areas of student services aa student 
records, adm1aaione, financial a ide and placement. 
Anthony J. Humphreys and Arthur R. Traxler, Guidance 
Servicea, Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc. , 
1954 ,  p. 74 . 
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Guidance and student peraonnel work are relatively 
new profeaaions since Frank l.�rsona 1n 1908 organ1Zed the 
Vocational Bureau of Boston. "It is said that this waa 
the first time on record that the terms • vocational 
guidance' and •vocational counselor' were used ."2 Since 
that time the areas of guidance and student personnel 
work have grown immensely. The 1966 American Personnel 
and Guidance Aeaociat1on convention was the largest con­
vention ever to be held in Washington, D.c.3 Currently 
the membership of the APOA is approximately 30,000 guid-
ande and student personnel workers. 
Guidance and student personnel services have become 
a new profeaaion; and that it 1a a profeaeion cannot be 
denied. 
Pormerly theology. law. and medicine 
were specifically known as ' the pro­
teaaiona • ;  but aa the applications 
of science and learning are extended 
to other departments ot affairs. 
other vocations also receive the 
name. The work 1ntpl1ea proteaaed 
attainments in apeo1al knowledge 4 aa distinguished from mere skill. 
'l'he same court also said that a profeaaional ia one en­
gaged 1n mental work which ia varied 1n character rather 
than routine and requires knowledge or an advanced type 
2 
Ibid •• p .  6. 
3 
The Ouide�oat, 
Guidance Xaaocla Ion, 
4 
Washington: 
VIII. No. 6 
Aulen v.  Triumph Explosive, 
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American Personnel and 
(June, 1966) , 5. 
58 F .  SUpp . 8 (1944). 
which is acquired by prolonged intellectual study. The 
professional is also require<; to exercue discretion and 
Judgment in his work, and the work output is one that 
cannot be standard1Zed in relation to a given period of 
time.5 Profession has also been defined by the courts as 
a " vocation, calling, occupation or employment involving 
labor, skill, education, special knowledge and compensation 
or profit, but the labor and skill involved is predominantly 
mental or intellectual, rather than physical or menta1."6 
Guidance and student personnel work can then be 
ri�ttully called legitL�ate proteaaions and will be re­
ferred to aa such since they encompass mental and intellec­
tual skill, advanced educational requirements, specialized 
knowledge , and compensation. The personnel worker recognizes 
his work as professional and has established professional 
organizations with recognized codes of ethics. Departments 
of education have provided positions and opportunities for 
counselors 1n many states, the federal government has appro­
priated tunda for training counselors and establishing 
counseling centers, and states have set up license require­
ments tor counselor certification. Involvement 1n legis­
lative activities by the American Personnel and Guidance 
(2d) 
Ibid., p. 8. 
6 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Crazy Water Co., 160 s. W. 
102 (1942). 
-
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Association serves also to 1dent11'y guidance and personnel 
work as a profession: 
The Association serves aa a major source 
of information, research, and expert 
opinion on guidance and personnel work 
to the Congress ot the united States, 
to federal, state, and local governments, 
to independent agencies, to the general 
public, and to 1ta members. 
APGA presents its views 1n various ways. 
Teetimony is given before Committees of 
Congress upon re!ueat. Porrnal letters or 
information are ranamitted to the Con­
gress upon invitation. When requested 
to do ao, APGA stat? provides expert 
conau!tation for Congressional Committee 
Chairmen, Conunittee membera, and House 
and Senate Conunittee 8*a!Ste. APQA 
members, as profeaaional persons, fre­
quently express their individual views 
to Congresa.7 
The profeaaional statua of guidance and student 
personnel is established, yet it ia hindered insofar as 
it does not enjoy some of the legal privileges granted 
to other professions. It doea not have the immunity of 
privileged communication that 1• enjoyed by the legal, 
medical, and theological profeaaiona either by statute, 
constitution, or caae law, even though 1t is involved in 
communications with others which by their verry nature must 
remain privileged. Interviews, records, and private dia­
cuaaiona between the guidance or student personnel worker 
and his client must be kept contidential in order that the 
Carl McDaniela, " The Leg1alat1ve Position of the APOA,," 
Personnel and Guidance Journal, XLIII (April, 1965), p.  833. 
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counselor may effectively gain the confidence of his client 
and successfully establish a meaningful relationship. It 
is not surprising than that concern should arise over the 
legal responsibilities of the profession. 
There has been much question among the members of 
the guidance and student personnel profession concerning 
their legal rights and responsibilities 1n recent years. 
This is evidenced by the number of a:a:·t1cles that have 
been published in professional Journals, books, and papers 
regarding the legal aspects and problems of the profession; 
an� a number of conferences and speeches have embraced the 
subj ect at meetings of professional organizations. In 1962 
in Philadelphia, Martha Ware preeented a speech entitled 
" Freedom to Refrain" to the Pennsylvania Asaoc1at1on of 
Women Deana and Counselors in which she discussed the con-
f ident1al1ty of the counselor regarding student records. 
As early as 1954 Thomas M. Carter 1n the November issue of 
the Personnel and Guidance Journal expressed his concern 
over the professional immunity and privileged communication 
of the counselor. 11 Some Le gal Implications for Personnel 
Officers" by Douglas Parker was published in the Journal of 
the National Association ot Women Deana and Counselors warn­
ing personnel workers of poaa1ble liability for some of 
their actions; and Inez Livingston 1n the Personnel and 
Guidance Journal 1n January, 1965, aaka the queation "Is 
the Personnel Worker Liable?" Justin Snith spoke about 
the confidentiality of records and student rights at the 
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American Personnel and Guidance Association convention 
in Minneapolis in 1965, and Jeveral ses31ons of the 1970 
convention in New Orleans were devoted to the legal 
problems of the guidance and student personnel worker. 
The guidance and student personnel worker should be 
concerned about all the legal aspects of his profession. 
but since this is a study of tort liability for negligence 
attention will be focused on this facet. There is very 
little Judicial precedent regarding the subject of legal 
liability tor negligence of the guidance and student per­
so:mel worker. with few cases eve.,.. o�ought before the 
courts of law; and almost no legislation relating to people 
1n these areas has been developed 1n federal or state 
statutes. But this does not grant any protection from 
liability to individuals engaged 1n the profession of 
guidance and student personnel work when their actions are 
alleged to be directly responsible for the inJuries incurred 
by others. Guidance and student personnel workers. teachers, 
and other school employees, as well as doctors, lawyers. 
and accountants are individually responsible for their own 
acts. If another is injured as a direct result of the neg­
ligence of a guidance or student personnel worker, the 1nd1� 
vidual guidance or student peraonnel worker may be held 
liable if a cause of action can be shown to exist. 
Having defined the areas of guidance and student 
personnel work and having established these occupations as 
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profesa1ons with very little legal precedent. the question 
now arises of' the respons1b1.i1ty of the guidance and 
student pe rsonnel worker for his negligent actions. The 
followin� chapters will explore the theory of tort liabi­
lity for negligence as it began 1n common law. as it is 
today, and how it is related to the areas of guidance and 
student personnel work. 
-
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CHAPTER II 
NEGLIGENCE 
Tort as defined by Black, a noted authority in law, 
is a private or civil wrong or injury 1ndepend•nt of 
contract. a Thia is to say that a tort is a wrongful act 
tor which a legal action may lie. The person who commits 
the to�tioua act (defendant) ia obliged under law (liable ) 
to the 1nJured party (plaintitf) .  Unlike a crime for which 
the state will prosecute, the civil action for • tort ia 
initiated by the 1nJured party. 
"Until the middle of the eighteenth century, it (tort) 
was 1n common use in England and America aa a synonym for 
•wrong•. Gradually its uaage was restricted to the tecpn1cal 
vocabulary of the lawyer. It 1a now defined as any wrongful 
act, other than a breach of contract, which may serve as the 
basis tor a auit for damages."9 
A tort committed aga1nat another person may be done 
intentionally or it may be the result or negligence.  Those 
torta which are willful or intentional include aaaault, bat­
tery, talae 1mpr1aonment, defamation ot character, treapaaa 
Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, St. Paul, 
Minn. : West Publishing Company, 1951, p. 1660. 
9 
Thomas Edward Bl ackwell, College Law: A Guide for 
Administrators, Washington: American Council on Bilucat1on, 
1961, p. 9. 
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to land, treapaaa to chattels, invasion of the right of 
privacy, release of information, fraud and conversion. 
When a tort is willful or intentional the one who commits 
the act (tortfeaaor) knows or 1a uaually certain that his 
action will cauae injury to another. Intentional torts, 
however, are not the subject of this paper and will not 
be discussed 1n further detail. 
Negligence, which is the main theme, may be defined 
as aa act or omission which unreasonably does or may 
affect the rights of others. It 1a "the omission to do 
something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary 
conaideratione which ordinarily regulate human affairs, 
would do, or the doing ot something which a reasonable and 
prudent man would not do.1 10 Negligence does not require 
intent on the part or the actor. It is auff icient that the 
commission or omission occurred even through carelessness 
or thoughtleaaneaa. Negligence in itself does not consti­
tute the tort, but negligence becomes a tort when a person 
performs an act or neglects to perform an act that unreason­
ably result• in the proximate cause of another's injury. 
'!'he definition of negligence tells us that one can be 
liable for an act �r tor the omission of an act that affects 
the rights of others and results in harm. "Intention as well 
Io 
Black, op. c1t., p. 1184. 
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as action may be negligenoe."ll It makes no difference 
if the negligence is active or passive or if the injury 
arose through the nonfeasenee, the malfeasance, or the 
misfeasance of the wrongdoer.12 Nonteaaance is "the 
omission to do something, especially what ought to have 
been done;"l3 malfeasance is "the doing of an act which 
a person ought not to do;"l4 and misfeasance is "the doing 
wrongfullJ and injuriously of an act which one might do in 
a la�; .. ul manner." 15 The court also says that either mis­
feasance or nonteasance or a combination of both may be 
considered negligence. 16 "Negligence is want of ordinary 
care and may consist in doing something which ought not to 
be done, or in not doing aomething which ought to be done."17 
Aa guidance and student personnel workers and as indi­
viduals we have a negative duty ot not doing willful harm 
as well as a positive duty to avoid injury to another. we, 
11 
Public Service Co. of N. H. v. Elliott, 123 F {2d) 
2 (1941 • 
12 
Gindele v. Corrigan, 22 M. 1. 516 (1889). 
13 
Webster's New Colle�iate Dictionarz, Springfield, Mass. : 
a. & c. Merriam company, 1 53, p. 571. 
14 
Ibid., p. 508. 
15 
Ibid., p. 538. 
16 
Dauris1o v. Merchant'• Dispatch Transportation Co., 
274 N. Y. S. 174 (1934). 
17 
Lepotaiq v. Chapman, 10 Ohio Law Rep. 560 (1911). 
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therefore, must be as concerned with doing nothing 1n a 
situation that calls for action, as well aa with an overt 
act which becomes the reason for another's suffering. 
When to act or when to refrain from acting is often a 
difficult decision. The difference between misfeasance 
and nonfeasance is obvious in theory, but in practice it 
is not always eaay to say when conduct is active or paaaive.18 
'!'here is no distinction made in early conunon law be­
tween negligence and the other torta. It came into 1ta 
own in the nineteenth century and 1a beat summed up aa 
follows: 
18 
"Negligence was acarecely recognized 
as a separate tort before the earlier 
part or the nineteenth century. Prior 
to that time, the word had been used in 
a very general sense to describe the 
breach or any legal obligation, or to 
designate a mental element, usually one 
of inadvertence or indifference, enter­
ing into the comm1aa1on of other torts. 
Some writers once maintained that negli­
gence is merely one way of committing 
any particular tort, Juat as some courts, 
for example, still speak occaaionally 
of a negligent 'battery.' But for more 
than a century, it haa received more or 
leas general recognition of an indepen­
dent basis of liability • • • • Today 
problems and principles, aa well as 
distinct queat1ona
1
or policy, arise in 
negligence cases." � 
Francia H. Bohlen, "The Moral Duty to Aid Others 
as a Basia or 'l'ort Liab111ty1.." University of Pennsylvania Law 8ev1ew, LVI, (April, 190�), p. 220. 
19 
B. Smith Young and William M. Prosser, Torts: Cases 
and Materials, Brooklyn, N. Y.: The Foundation Press, 1957, 
p. 206. 
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In addition to being a separate tort, negligence 
may also be a v1olet1on of some statute that requires 
or prohibits action and that waa established for the 
purpose of protecting individuals or property, as well 
as the careless or negligent performance of a contract.20 
Thua, a tort may be a crime against the state and one who 
is tried in a criminal court may also be sued for damages 
in a civil court. A person may be tried by the state for 
manslaughter in the death of another through the negligent 
operation of an automobile, but he may also face civil 
action tor the tort by the decedent's heirs and be required 
to pay damages. 
A tort action may also grow out or a breach of con-
tract if any injury occurs, but the breach itself cannot 
be a tort. "An action as for a tort or an action aa for 
a breach of contract may be brought by the same party on 
the same state of facts. 1' 21 Only when the defendant fails 
to perform a legal duty which results in injury to the 
plaintiff while he fails to fulfill a contract will a 
cause of action lie 1n either a tort or contract court. 
It is, however, with the civil action for the tort with 
which we will be primarily concerned. 
20 
Walker v. Klopp, 157 N. w. 962 (1916). 
21 
Louisville and Maahtille R. R. Co. v. 8p1nke, 30 
s. B. 968 (1898). 
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The criterion necessary for determining negligence 
is that of the reasonable man and ordinary care. The 
court attempts to define ordinary care in Hill v. City 
ot Glenwood. 
There is no precise definition of 
ordinary care1 but it may be said 
that it 1s such care as an ordinarily 
prudent person would exercise under 
like circumstances1 and should be pro­
portioned to the danger and peril 
reasonably to be apprehen�ed from a lack of proper prudence.2 
The standard then is always that care which a reasonable 
man would use if he were in a like or similar situation. 
But the question now arises of who is a reasonable man 
and how is this determined. 
The Common Law of England (predecessor 
of our legal system) has been labori­
ously built upon a mythical figure-­
the figure of �The Reasonable Man' 
• • • • He is an ideal1 a standard, 
the embodiment of all those qualities 
which we demand of the good citizen 
• • • • The Reasonable Man is always 
thinking of others; prudence is his 
guide and •safety First' • • •  is his 
rule of life • • • • He is one who in­
variably looks where he is go1ng1 and 
is careful to examine the immediate 
foreground �efore he executes a leap or a bound. j 
A reasonable man is one who exercises a standard of 
care dictated by the circumstances in which he is involved. 
22100 N. W. 523 (1904). 
23 
A. P. Herbert1 Misleading Cases 1n the Common Law1 
New York: G. P. Putnam1 1930, pp. 12-15. 
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Whether or not one has acted as a reasonable man will be 
determined by a Judge and a jury in a court of law and 
will be dependent upon the elements involved 1n the legal 
test of a tortious act. Thus, negligence constitutes a 
question of fact to be decided upon in each case. 
Before liability can attach, however, there are three 
elements in every tort actio� that must exist in order for 
there to be a cause of action. These are the existence of 
a legal duty toward the injured person; a breach or viola­
tion of the duty; and damage as the direct and proximate 
result of the breach.24 The absence of any of the three 
elements of negligence is fatal to a claim.25 
Duty requires that a standard of conduct be adopted, 
and that this conduct not violate the rights of another. 
The existence of a legal duty toward the injured party is 
upheld in such cases as Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad 
Company when the court said that ''there is no negligence 
unless there is in the particular case a legal duty to 
take care, and this duty must be one which is owed to the 
plaintiff himself and not merely to others.1 26 Again in 
24 
City of Mobile v. McClure, 127 s. 832 (1930), 
25 
Howard v. Fowler, 207 s. w. (2d) 559 (1947). 
26 
162 N. B. 99 (1928). 
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Belt v. City or Grand Forks. N. D •• the court ruled that 
"'Negligence' being failure to perform a duty. there can 
be no negligence. in absence of duty.1127 In other words, 
before negligence can be found a relationship mu3t exist 
between the injured party and the person com itting the 
injury, and this relationship must be one 1n which the 
commission of a wrong by one becomes the invasion of the 
right of the other. "If the defendant was negligent but 
did not have a duty to the plaintiff. defendant's negligence 
does not make him liable for judgment for he was under no 
duty to the pla1nt1f f. u 28 The decision of whether 01• not 
e duty is owed is also a question of law to be decided 
upon by the court. 
The second element of a tort that must be decided 
upon if there is to be a cause of action is whether or 
not there exists a breach in the duty that the defendant 
owes to the plaintiff. For a breach to exist# the one 
alleged to have committed the wrong must have failed to 
conform to the standard of conduct that was required of 
him. To establish the negligence, the plaintiff must 
show that the defendant failed to use the proper care in 
performing his duty. 
The third element of a tort is present when the 1n­
Jury is the direct result of the negligent party's breach 
27 
68 N. W. (2d) 114 (1955). 
28 
William L. Prosser, Handbook ot the Law of Torts, 
st. Paul, Minn.: west Publishing Company. 1964, p. 1%16. 
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of duty. It the duty to the plaintiff did in fact exist. 
and if a breach or that duty did occur by an act or a 
failure to act on the part or the defendant, and it the 
inJury incurred by the plaintiff ia a violation of the 
plaintiff's rights and the direct result of the defend­
ant's negligence, the defendant may indeed be liable. 
It is not autficient that the injury occurred. Not only 
1nuat the plaint1rr•a rights be violated, but there must 
be a reaaonably close connection between the wrong occur­
ring to the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant. 
As stated by the court 1n �it• v. Schnoebelehn " • • • 
there must be a negligence and harm and they muat have a 
causal connection. "29 
The right to recover in a tort action rests on an 
additional ractor--that of damage. "Damage is an essen­
tial part or a cause of action tor negligence and muat 
be alleged."30 Pl aintiff must have aui'fered an actual 
1nJury rather than having merely been placed 1n a poai-
t ion to aurrer possible lnJury •1thout actually being 
damaged. "Nominal damagea to vindicate a technical 
right cannot be recovered in a negligence action where 
no losa haa occurred. The threat of future harm not yet 
realiZed 1e not enough.'' 31 When the possibility or danger 
29 
18 A. (2d) 186 (1941). 
30 
wells v.  Poland, 198 N. B. 764 (1935). 
31 
Prosser, op. cit. , PP• 146-47. 
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exists the wronged party may take measures to prevent 
the actual danger from occurring in another court, but 
he is not entitled to the right of recovery from the 
negligent party 1n a tort action. "Where negligent 
conduct threatens irreparable damage to property rights, 
a court or equity may act by 1nJunct1on to prevent the 
harm before it occurs."32 Again the court in White v. 
Schnoebelehn says, "'l'he posaib111ty that injury may re­
sult from an act or omission is sufficient to give the 
quality of 'negligence' to the act or omission; but 
possibility ia insufficient to impose any liability or 
give rise to a cause of action • • • • there is no cause 
of action unless and until there has been an inJury."33 
The main teat of negligence 1a foreseeability. 
Could the wrongdoer anticipate that his act or failure 
to act might produce harmful results? "Where a course 
of conduct 1a not presc1•1bed by mandate of law, foresee­
ability of inJury to one to whom duty 1a owed ia of the 
very essence ot negligence, and if injurious consequences 
are not foreseen as a result of the conduct, then that 
conduct 1a not negligent."34 
32 
Young and Prosser, op. cit., p. 207. 
33 
18 A. (2d) 186 (1941). 
34 
Cleveland v. Danville Traction and Power Co., 18 
s. E. (2d) 915 (1�42 • 
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There are no rules .f'or negligence and for deter­
mining 1f conduct was proper or negligent except the 
criterion of the re asonable man. If an ordinarily 
prudent person would or should have foreseen that his 
actions, or his failure to act, would lead to injury 
to another, his conduct would be considered negligent. 
Should he have foreseen the likelihood of harm as the 
result of his act? Was he afraid the d amage or injury 
might occur? Could he have stopped it? Did he rea­
sonably guard against the expected danger? "Where 1t 
should be apparent to a reasonable and prudent person 
that to pursue a certain course or conduct is likely 
to produce results injurious to others, the pursuit of 
such a course of conduct is negligence and it is not 
necessary that the precise or particular result be fore­
seen. " 35 " If a defendant could not reasonably foresee any 
in Jury as the result of r11s acts, or if his conduct was 
reasonable in the light of what he could anticipate, 
there ia no negligence and no 11ab1l1ty."36 
When an occurrence is unusual, extraord.4nary, and 
improbable, legally there is no liability. One cannot 
be liable for failing to anticipate an improbable danger. 
35 
McClelland v. Interstate Transit Lines, 6 N. w. 
( 2d ) 384 ( 1942 ) • 
36 
fil'a v. Hennepin Avenue M. B. Church, 297 N. w.  
334 (19 
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Remote possibilities cannot constitute negligence. "Fail­
ure to guard against a remote possibility of accident or 
one which could not, in the exercise of ordinary care, 
be foreseen, does not constitute ' negligence. ,n37 
Negligence must be determined in each case. It is 
"a fact which must be proved and will never be presumed, 
and proof of the occurrence of an accident does not raise 
a presumption of megligence." The burden of proof al-
ways lies with the plaintiff and his attorney since the 
civil action for a tort is always initiated by the in­
jured party. He must show why the injury occurred or 
the reason for the accident. The burden of furnishing proof 
of the existence of negligence is on the party who asserts 
or alleges it, and the burden of proof does not shift 
during the tr1a1. 39 Once the plaintiff has established 
the case and presented the essential facts in a negligence 
action, the defendant, j.2 he denies the negligence must 
show that he had used proper care. The decision to deter­
mine the responsibility for the alleged negligence is a 
function of the Judge and the jury in a cou;.·t of law and 
will be decided upon by them. 
37 
Rothstein v. Monetter, 17 N. Y. s. ( 2d )  369, 372 
(1940). 
38 
Grugan v. Sholl Hotels Finance and Exchange Corp., 
18 A. (2d) 30 (1941). 
39 
Cofjus Juris Secundum, New York: American Law Book 
Company, V X, p. 460. 
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Negligence is a distinct tort for which a civil 
action will lie. It is the failure to meet the standard 
of care required of a reasonable and prudent man under 
like or similar circumstances. If one's conduct falls 
short of this standard and results 1n injury to another 
he is liable in tort to the injured party. The necessary 
elements for a cause of action for negligence include 
duty, breach, proximate cause and damage. Foreseeability 
is the teat or negligence and the action initiated by the 
plaintiff must be decided on in a court of law by a Jury 
and a Judge. 
-
20
-
CHAPTER III 
NEGLIGENCE AND GUIDANCE 
Probably the most classic case in the courts of 
law involving the tort liability f'or negligence of the 
guidance and student personnel worker was that of Bogust 
v. Iverson.40 Here the defendant, a full-time director 
of student personnel services and a professor of educa-
tion, was charged with negligence by the parents of a 
deceased student. The student who was under the direct 
guidance and supervision of the defendant wes in need 
of professional guidance and committed suicide when the 
defendant terminated interviews with her. 'l'he acts of 
negligence alleged by the parents were the defendant's 
failure to offer proper 6Uidance, failure to secure psy­
chiatric care for the deceased, and failure to confer 
with the parents of the deceased, which prevented them 
from acquiring the proper care necessary for their daugh­
ter. The Superior Court of Wisconsin affirmed the deai­
sion of the circuit court which ruled 1n favor of the 
counselor defendant. 
Three points were brought out in the court' s reason­
ing of the case. First, the court decided that the 
40 
10 Wisc. (2d) 129, �02 N. w. (2d) 228 (1960). 
-21-
defendant waa not a person qualified as a m•dical doctor 
or a specialist in mental disorders, and as such could 
not be charged with the same degree or care as a person 
trained in medicine or psychiatry. "To hold that a tea­
cher who had had no training, education, or experience 
in medical fields is required to recognize 1n a student 
a condition, the diagnosis ot which is in a specialized 
and technical field would require a duty beyond reaaon."41 
Secondly, the complaint stated that the defendant 
was negligent in his failure to secure proper medical 
care for the deceased and his tailure to notify her par­
ents. The court ruled that to hold that the defendant 
was negligent, it must be alleged that the defendant 
knew that the deceased would commit suicide. But there 
was no allegation of faet that the defendant, as a rea­
sonably prudent man, could have been aware of such ten­
dencies on the part of the deceased. "The law does not 
require anyone 1n the exertlse of reasonable care to take 
measures against a danger which a person's mental condition 
does not suggest as likely to happen.1142 
41 
Frederick c .  S81bold, W1scons1n Reports: Cases 
Determined in the Supreme Court ot Wisconairi. MUrideleln, 
111.: ca11agban and company, 1961, p. 133. 
42 
Ib1d., p. 139· 
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Thirdly, the court stated that the deft111dant had 
no obligation to continue interviews with the deceased. 
There was no allegation that the interviews benefited 
the deceased, that the defendant had a duty to continue 
them, or that their termination was the cause of the 
student's death or in any way placed her in a worse 
situation. "One who gratuitously renders service to 
another, otherwise than by �aking charge of him when 
helpless, is not subject to liability for discontinuing 
the services if he does not thereby leave the other in 
a worse position than he was 1n when the services were 
began."43 Since no duty was found existing in this case 
one of the elements of a cause or action in tort for 
negligence is not present. 
"This case aroused much concern among those engaged 
in guidance and counseling and among their fellow members 
of the teaching profession. This concern was expressed in 
a brief' am1cus curiae {frit,lld or the court) submitted in 
the case by the National Education Association. 
43 
The implications of this case for the 
future of guidance programs in the schools 
and colleges of this country became clearer 
with the real1zat1on that, at the present 
time, there are approximately 25,000 full or 
part-time counselors employed by the schools 
and colleges in the fifty states. Any one 
of them might have been the defendant in 
this case. 
lb id • ' p • 13 5 • 
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To establish a precedent that a couse 
of action is stated by the facts plead­
ed here would create an occupational 
hazard of indeterminate proportions 
for each of these individuals and 
would, in effect, undermine the effec­
tiveness or a part of the public edu­
cational program that needs to be 
g�atly strengthened at the present 
time." 44 
Bogust v. Iverson is only one case on record, but 
there are other circWI18tancea where persons engaged in 
the practice of guidance and student personnel work may 
find themselves faced with legal responsibilities and 
liabilities for negligence. Inez Livingston points out 
that 1 it is not unconunon for a personnel worker, espe­
cially a residence hall advisor, to use his personal car 
to take home or to take to the hospital a student who 
is ill." 45 Neither is it uncommon for guid ance and 
student personnel workers to of fer to students rides to 
and from meetings, in inclement weather, or to out-of­
town conferences in their personal cars. If an accident 
occurs and the student is 1nJured in any of these cases, 
the guidance and student personnel worker is responsible 
and may be liable in a tort action for negligence regard-
less of the circumstances. 
44 
Martha L. Ware, Law of Guidance and Counselinf• 
Cincinnati, Ohio: w. H. Arideraon company, 1964, p. 63. 
45 
Inez B. Livingston, " Ia the Personnel Worker 
Liable?", Personnel and Guidance Journal, XLIII, (January, 
1965) . p. 1J73. 
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Guidance and student personnel worker� may be called 
upon to act in a situation where a student has already 
been injured or is already ill. What is the responsibility 
of the guidance or student personnel worker in such a caae? 
"If the per�onnel worker administers or prescribes any 
treatment he is liable for damages if the treatment should 
cause the student to be in a more serious condition than 
before the treatment."46 On the other hand there may be 
a duty on the part of the guidance or personnel worker to 
act in the event of an emergency. Since negligence con­
stitutes an act or an omission, failure to render the 
proper first aid in the event that a doctor or other medi­
cally trained individual is not immediately available, 
may be considered an omission. Thia may lead to an action 
in tort for negligence which might provide the guidance 
or student personnel worker with liability if he did not 
act as a reasonably prudent person would have acted in a 
similar circumstance. In this case the failure to do some­
thing could be alleged to be negligence. Emergency, how­
ever, depends on all the circumstances involved and the 
amount of injury incurred. 
Other questions of liability for negligence may and 
do arise in the life of a guidance and student personnel 
worker. Suppose a student is injured while acting in 
46 
Ibid. , p. 473. 
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accordance with advice given by a guidance or student 
personnel worker? What liability would attach if a stu­
dent 1s injured in the pursuance of some action which was 
given approval by the guidance or personnel worker, or 1n 
the pursuance of some action requested by the guidance or 
personnel worker? Will negligence be charged if a guid­
ance or personnel worker should have given advice but did 
not and the student was injured? 
SUppose a guidance or personnel worker, or any other 
school employee for that matter, fails to keep facilities 
in proper repair when they are placed under his supervision? 
What results if a student is inJured 1n a univer•tty- or 
college-owned building which has not been sufficiently pro­
vided with safety equipment and proper precautionary aids, 
or if guidance and student personnel workers have failed 
to alert students to an oncoming danger? Insec ure furnish­
ings, unmarked plate glass windows, untacked carpets and 
mats, hazardous walks and stairways, and failure to provid e  
necessary information required in case of fires and other 
natural disasters can all lead to possible 1nJury which can 
and may result in a cause of action for negligence. Lia­
bility might also attach in the absence of proper supervi­
sory personnel at college- or university-sponsored prog­
rams and activities. 
All of the above factors need to be given consideration. 
None ot the questions can be given a positive or negative 
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answer without first applying to them a definite set of 
facts. Then, the standard of care of the reasonable and 
prudent man in the same or similar circumstances will 
apply as it is determined by the Judge and Jury in the 
court. Must we wait for an occurrence or for some mishap 
before allowing our actions proper review and considera­
tion and perhaps be confronted with a court case? Then 
it will be too late to examine the facts and to say that 
we were not aware of the possible consequences of our 
negligent acts. Ignorance of the law cannot be used as 
an excuse. 
In a recent case at the University of C1nc1�nati the 
father of a minor student named three university officials, 
including student personnel workers, in a damage suit in 
connection with the disappearance of his daughter from a 
college residence hall. The alleged charges included the 
university's failure to provide protection as to the girl's 
health, safety and morals. We may argue that it is not 
the responsibility of the schools and universities to in­
sure the health, safety and morals of its student• and that 
we are in an age where the doctrine of in loco parentia is 
not being recognized as a function of the schools and un1-
versi ties, and yet legally we are being asked to account 
for actions which f a11 to provide circumstances regulating 
student conduct which could result in student injuries. 
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This will not be an attempt to discuss the theory 
of in loco parent1s or to a dvocate its acceptance or 
its reversal. The situation in Cincinnati, however, has 
left the university and its officials open to a cause 
of action for negligence. How will the courts decide? 
Will the alleged facts be shown to be negligence? Can 
the university off ic1als meet the test of the reasonable and 
prudent man? Should the university have foreseen the con­
sequences? Did they neglect a duty which resulted in an 
injury? All these questions can only be decided on by 
the courts, now that the case has been brought before them. 
Whatever the verdict, the case should make us awere of the 
possibility of suit where the actions of the guidance and 
student personnel worker are alleged to be negligent. 
The Wisconsin courts 1:1 Bogust v. Iverson in which 
the defendant student personnel worker was alleged to be 
negligent in a tort action for the death ot the plaintiff's 
daughter did not find the defendant liable. The court 
felt that under the circumstances the defendant had no 
duty to the pla intiff. Guidance and student personnel 
workers are daily faced with situations that could lead to 
a similar cause of action, and a case of alleged negligence 
is now pending in the Ohio courts. The question of whether 
or not Bogust v. Iverson has set a precedent for the guid­
ance and student personnel worker and whether the Ohio 
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courts will again rule in !'avor of the defendant remain 
to be answered. We must wait for the decision of the 
courts. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WHO IS LIABLE? 
A number of doctrines under common law, upon which 
our present legal system is baaed, granted freedom from 
liability tor negligence on the part of both the public 
and private schools. It was the general principle in 
common law that the State, as a sovereign, is not liable 
in tort for damages for any injuries resulting from the 
negligence of its officers, agents, and employee5. It 
is believed that the com.�on law doctrine of state sove-
reignty provided its immunity to all arms of the state 
and had its founding in 1783 in the Bngl1ah common law 
case of Russell v. Men of Devon. 47 The principle here is 
often ref' erred to 1n terms of the �king can do no wrogg" 
and was later interpreted and accepted as the "state can 
do no wrong11 and carried over into American jurisprudence. 
This principle of state sovereignty extending to all 
agencies of the state included the sc:.ool districts. 
47 
The overwhelmingly recognized general 
rule regarding school tort liability 
is that the schools are quasi-corpora­
tions created as an agency of the 
state to execute the purely govern­
mental function of providing a free 
100 Bng. Rep. 359, 2 T. R. 667 (1788 ) .  
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and public education for the residents 
of the state. As such they are im­
bued with the state's immunity from 
tort liability in the absence of a 
clear statute imposing such 11ab1lity. 48 
In Livingston v. Regents of New Mexico College49 the court 
prohibited recovery for damages resulting from tort liabi­
lity on the ground of state sovereignty even though the 
board of regents carried comprehensive liability insurance. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity for the schools had its 
basis in Illinois in the case of Kinnare v. City of Chicago.SO 
This doctrine of state sovereignty together with the 
doctrine that school districts do not have sufficient money 
with which to pay liability claims provided the 1:·as1s for 
the school district's immunity from tort liability for neg-
ligence. The reasoning behind the public funds theory was 
the belief that school dist�icts are supported by taxes1 
and the taxpayers money cannot be used for the purpose of 
satisfying legal judg.�ents. In Thomas v. Broadlands51 the 
court of Illinois allowed the doctrine of public funds to 
be the decisive factor in its Judgment in favor of the 
schools. 
48 
Robert Stroup# n School Tort Immunity I" North 
Dakota Law Review1 XLIII, {Summer, 1967), p. 783. 
49 
328 P. {2d) 78 (1958). 
50 
49 N. E. 536 (1898). 
51 
109 N. B. {2d) 636 (1952). 
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There are many who have found fault with the prin­
ciple of state sovereignty and publ ic funds, however, and 
school districts are finding it more and more difficult 
to protect themselves from legal and financial re sponsi­
bil ity i'or negligence . In the past few years the prin-
c1ple of governmental immunity has been reversed in many 
states. The doctrine as it existed in co��on law is 
now undergoing much study in the courts with the tendency 
toward its abolishment.  Judicial decree as well as legi­
slat ive statutes are abrogating the principle of school 
district immunity. " Criticism of the rule has not gone 
unheeded for the governmental immunity doctrine has been 
revoked in many states by the courts and legislatures . " 52 
Illinois was the pacesetter for abrogating the tort immu­
nity doctrine with its 1 95S decision in Mol itor v .  Kane­
land Community Unit School D1str1ct. 53 Other states soon 
followed the precedent s�t by Illinois . " Michigan in 
1961, Wisconsin and Minnesota in 1962, and Arizona in 
1963 abolished 1?1ununity of school districts." 54 rt New 
York, California and Washington abrogated the immunity 
doctrine though constitutional amendment o r  appropriate 
52 
Stroup, op. cit . ,  p .  787. 
53 
163 N. B. (2d )  89 (1959). 
54 
Edmund B. Reutter, Jr. , Schools and the Law, Dobbs 
Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, In c . ,  1964, p .  109. 
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legislation . 11 55 " Comprehensive tort liability statutes 
now exist in Alaska, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Utah, and Washington . " 56 
School districts are now subject to the same liability 
for tort as are private individuals or corporations. 
The same trend toward reversing immunity for tort 
liability for negligence took place even earlier 1n the 
private school s .  Under the " trust-fund" doctrine chari­
table and educational institutions were protected against 
char�es of ne�ligence . It was considered unjust for the 
direct beneficiary of a charity to further depJiete the 
funds avallable for charitable use by any clair:i for com-
pensation in a tort action . But it was not always easy 
to determine who was a recipient of the charity. A stu­
dent paying full tuition mizht not be considered a direct 
recipient and could be el igible to recover damages in a 
tort action if injured ti:rough the negligence or the 
educational institution or one of its a�ents or employees . 
" Prior to 1942 onll two or three courts had rejected the 
im.'nunity or charities outright. "  57 The case of President 
50 
Cheater M. Nolte, "Minnesota Joins Growing List of 
States Abrogating Historic Immunity Doctrine," American 
School Board Journal , CXLVII, (December, 1963) ,  p .  13. 
56 
Stroup, op. cit , ,  p .  790. 
57 
Prosser, op. c it . ,  p .  787. 
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and Directors of Gerogetown College v. Hughes58 set a 
prec edent by reversing the charitable immunity doctrine. 
" By  1955, the courts of only twelve states--Arkansas, 
Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ore­
gon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
and Wyoming--were still recongizing the doctrine of com­
plete immunity for charitiea.0 59 
The primary reasons advanced for 
abandoning immunity doctrines are 
that neither those who organize a 
charitable institution nor the 
courts have authority to put chari­
ties beyond the pale or the law 
applicable to all, and that pro­
tection of life and limb by orga­
nized society is  of greater impor­
tance to mankind than any species 
of charity, and is auperior to 
rights of property .oO 
Thus, the historic defenses are becoming less and less 
available either to private and endowed schools or to 
public schools, and the schools are indeed being held 
liable for negligence in a tort action. 
The doctrines of charitable immunity and state sov­
ereignty, even when they were at their peak in providing 
freedom from tort liability to schools, did not always 
protect the individual employee against liability for 
injury sustained by others through his negligence. Neg­
ligence suits were brought directly against the individual 
58 
130 F. (2d) 810 (1942). 
59 
Blackwell, op. cit. , p. 151. 
60 
American Jurisprudence, Rochester, New York : Lawyers' 
Cooperative Pub11sh1ng Company, xv, p. 176. 
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involved and these individuals were held liable in tort 
for their negligent actions. 
Even though some states will still recognize the 
principles of sovereign immunity and charitable immunity 
as applicable to schools, due care is the personal res-
pons1b111ty of all. Negligence is not excused and indi­
viduals may still be sued and held liable for their 
a ctions when they result 1n inj ury to another. 
One of the basic ends of the law of 
torts is to place the ultimate lia­
bility for n egligent injury on the 
p erson or persons who are primarily 
responsible for the injury inflicted. 
So, as a general rule, every person 
who is legally responsible is liable 
for his own negligence which is the 
proximate cause of any inJury to another, 
or of damage to property. Liability 
for one's negligence is the rule, and 
all concepts of 1mmunit� are really 
exceptions to the rule. bl 
In Grosso v .  Witteman6 2  the court stated that a teacher 
may be liable for inj ury to students caused by his failure 
to use reasonable care. Where duty, breach and proximate 
cause are alleged to exist, a case can be established 
against a teacher, guidance or student personnel worker 
or other school employee and the court will determine if 
liability will ensue. 
61 
Co�ua Juris Secundum, New York : 
Company, v, p. 1034. 
6 2  
6 2  N. W. (2d ) 386 (1954). 
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American Law Book 
The teacher ' s  liability i'or damages 
resulting from hia negli�ent act 
in and about the school rests on the 
same principles aa h1a liability as 
a private person, removed from the 
school. The same standard of care 
applies, that of a reasonable and 
prudent person acting under like 
circumatancea • • • • The aame rule 
with respect to actual causation, 
foreseeability, and proximate cause 
govern the case, and the defenses 
available to the teacher are no more 
or leas extensive than thoae
6
ava11-
able to any other defendant. 3 
The number of teachers and other school employees who have 
been sued in recent years 1a on the rise and the amount of 
money being awarded for damages resulting from negligence 
of school employees in tort actions 1a also increasing. 
It haa been established that guidance and student 
personnel work are profesaiona and that the guidance and 
student personnel worker ia a proteaaional, and that there 
is little legal precedence for the profession. Thus, it 
will be neceaaary to show the effect of tort liability 
for negligence on other profeaaionala and relate these to 
the guidance and student personnel worker. Will the court 
use the eame yardstick and the aame standard ot care for 
the profeaa1onal as it doea with any other 1nd1v1dual ? 
The atandard of care 1• that or the reasonable and 
prudent man in like or similar circumatanoes .  Thia shows 
63 
Paul o. Proehl, " Tort Liability or Teachers," 
Venderb1lt La• .Review, XII (1959 ), P •  723 . 
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that the exercise of due care is an individual respon­
sibility, but the exercise of utmost c are is a professional 
respons1b111ty. 64 In Dorris v .  warford65 the court says 
that one who employs a professional man may expect from 
him the same ordinary care and skill as one may expect 
from any other member of the profession, not as one may 
expect from any other individual. 
Guidance and student personnel workers including 
deans, residence hall counselors, housing officers, acti­
vities and athletic directors are all employees of the 
school and are subject to the same l iability for negl i-
gence as others engaged 1n their profession, and must 
exercise the same standard or care as do those others in 
the same profession. " Professional personnel are held 
l egally to a standard commensurate with their professional 
training. "  66 
The professional is an expert. Professional respon­
sibility then requires an expert standard of care. The 
physician, l awyer and accountant are c onsidered professionals 
and the court requires the expert c are and dil igence 
e&ercised by members of their p rofession. In Cochran v. 
Harrison Memorial Hospital the court held that " before a 
64 
" School Laws and Teacher Negligence," N.B. A. Re ­
search Bull etin, XL, (October, 1962), p. 75 . 
65 
100 s. w. 312 ( 1907). 
66 
Reutte r, op. cit. , p. 74. 
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physician or surgeon could be held 1:1.able for malpractice, 
he must have done something in the treatment of his patient 
which the recognized standard of the medical practice in 
h1s conununity forbids in s uch cases, or he must have geg­
l ected to do something required by that standard.11 67 The 
J udge and J ury still decide whether the alleged negligence 
exists,  but often they rauat turn directly t o  the profession 
for assist ance in hel ping them to determine what is negli­
gent conduct and whether the defendant exercised due care. 
This is expressed by the court in Adkins v. Ropp. 
• . • the general rule in malpractice 
c ases is that, in determining whether 
the physician and surgeon has exercised 
ordinary skill and care • • •  , the J ury 
must be guided sol ely by the testimony 
of physicians and surgeons because of 
the scientific nature and character of 
the questions involved in s uch cases, 
and the jury c annot set up steodard8 
or skill and care of its own.btl 
Again in MacKenzie v. Carman the court says : 
67 
The law thus requires a surgeon t o  
possess the skill and l earning which 
is possessed by the average member 
of the medical profession in good 
standing, and to apply that skill 
and learning with ordinary reas on­
abl e  care. He is not liable for a 
mere error of Judgment, provided 
he does what he thinks 1a best af­
ter a c areful examination. He does 
not guarantee a good result, but he 
promises by 1mpl1cat1on t o  use the 
254 P .  {2d )  755 (1953) . 
68 
14 N.  E. (2d ) 727 (1938) . 
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skill and learning of the average 
physician, to exerc ise reasonable 
care, and to exert his best j udg­
ment in the er5ort to bring about 
e good re sult . "i 
As to t he standard of c are applied to members of 
the legal profession the court in Humboldt Building Asso­
ciation Company v. Drucker ' s  Executors declared that " the 
attorney is liable to his client for the want of such skill, 
care,, and diligence as men of the legal profession conunonly 
possess and exercise in like matters of professional employ­
ment . n 70 And in t he City of Grand Forks v. State the court 
in discussing the liability of the professional accountant 
said ,  " J>efendanta rep resented themselves as expert account-
ants, which implied that they were skilled in that class 
of work. In accepting employment as expert accountants,, 
they undertook and the plaint iff had the right to expect, 
that in the performance of their duties they would exercise 
the average ability and skill of those engaged in that 
branch of skilled labor. " 71 
Having viewed the court's stand on the medical, legal 
and accounting professions and their st andard of c are in 
ner,11gence c ases, and the court ' s  acceptance of guidance 
and student personnel work as a profession one can then 
69 
92 N.Y. Supp. lo63 (1905). 
r{O 
64 s. w. 671 {1901). 
71 
141 N. w. 181 (1913). 
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parallel the standard of care required of all professionals 
to that of the guidance and student personnel worker .  If 
the guidance or student personnel worker is found to be 
negl igent according to the standards of his profession 
he will undoubtedl :r be judged by the expert standard o f  
care required o f  a reasonable and prudent guidance or stu­
dent personnel worker in the same or s imilar circumstances . 
Any non-compl iance with this standard that results in neg­
l igence and injury will bring upon the guidance or person­
nel worker a l iabil ity ln tort that could prove to be per­
sonally, financially and professionally embarrassing . 
The doctrines of immunity for state and charitable 
institutions and organizations are slowly d isappearing from 
the court s ,  and schools and school districts are now l iable 
in tort actions for their negligence and for the negligence 
of their employees and agent s .  In addition to the l iability 
of' the schools and school districts the exercise of due care 
is an individual responsibility for which the individual 
will be liable, and the standard of c are of the reasonable 
and prudent man applies to all individuals .  The standard 
of care required of all profe ssionals, however, exceeds the 
standard expected of any other individual . A profess ional 
is an expert who is required to meet the same expert stan­
dard of care as are all other members of his profession. 
The proper standard of care will still be determined by a 
-40-
Judge and jury 1 but the profession itsel:.' will be asked 
to give them proper direction . 
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CHAP'l'ER V 
PROTBCTIOH AGAINS'l' LIABILITY 
'l'o avoid liability in tort for negligence all that 
is �quired of a guidance and student personnel worker 
is that he exercise the proper care that is required ot 
a reasonable and prudent guidance or student personnel 
worker. The law does not require the guidance or student 
personnel worker to guarantee that his actions will not 
be the cause of 1nJury bo another; all that he muat do 
ia exercise the necessary amount of due care so that 
another will not be 1nJured through any fault of hia. 
Extraordinary diligence is not necessary against pure 
accidents that can and do happen deaptte precautions, and 
clairvoyance regarding foreseeability is not within the 
realm of reasonableness. The applications of basic common 
sense and good J udgment are the only necessities to pre­
vent occurrences of aituat1ona which might lead to a cause 
of action and liability for negligence . 'l'he beat way to 
protect against suit and liability ia through the exercise 
ot ordinary care, the application ot an adequate safety 
program personally and professionally, and the practice 
of foresight, not hindsight, with regard to one ' s  actions. 
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In the event that the guidance or student personnel 
worker does become involved in a tort case for negligence, 
some ot the following defenses are available to him. These 
are the aame detenaea that are available to any individual . 
and muat be applied to the alleged facts in each circum­
stance . 
A denial ot negligence or a statement ot no negligence 
on the part ot the detendant regarding the alleged tacts 
can be brought by the guidance or student personnel worker. 
The defendant muat show that he was not negligent , that he 
acted aa a reasonable and prudent man, that he used proper 
care and that he took all reasonable precautions. The 
detendant • a  actions are put to the Jury tor a decision. 
The defendant can show that one ot the elements ot a 
tort action 1a not present. It there is no duty, no breach, 
or no proximate cause and no damage there cannot be a cause 
ot action tor negligence . 
An interveninr, cause may negate a cause or action tor 
negligence. It has been eatabl1ahed that there must be an 
unbroken causal connection between the negligence and the 
in�ury or damage auttered. Any event which breaks the 
natural sequence between the detendant' a  action and the 
plaintiff' •  1nJury will be considered an intervening cause . 
Whether the intervening cause was responsible for the plain­
t1rr • a  inJury or whether it was set in motion by the defen­
dant ' s  negligence will need to be determined by the Jury. 
It cannot always be safely assumed that the intervening 
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cause ia a reliable criterion tor nonliability. 72 
An act or God could be reaponsible tor the inJ ury 
incurred by the plaintiff. Where there is no human inter­
vention in a circumstance that leads to 1nJury and where 
the 1nJury reeul t• from the direct. immediate and exclu­
sive operation or natural torcea completely uncontrolled 
by m3n, the detendant may plead that the 1nJury was the 
result or . an act or Qod. When there is no act of negli­
gence on ihe part or the defendant and no amount of rore­
a1ght could have prevented the injury the defendant is 
innocent et any causality. 
No posa1b111t7 or foreseeability on the part ot the 
defendant could mean no cause ot action. An unavoidable 
accident which could not have been prevented. an unusual 
occurrence which would probably not have happened. or a 
remote poaa1b111ty which would not be due to any lack or 
reasonable care on the part or the defendant cannot be ad­
Judged to be negligence. When one oannot reasonably foresee 
the possibility ot 1nJury an action cannot lie tor an in­
voluntary accident. The court demands ordinary care but 
it does not require over-protection or extra-caution. 
A statute of limitations may expel a cause or action 
tor negligence from the courts. The statute of limitations 
72 
Gibson v. Garcia, 216 P.  (2d) 119 ( 1950 ). 
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designates the amount of time between the accident or 
occurrence causing the inJury and the filing ot the claim 
for damages by the plaintiff. Kach state individually 
determines the statute of l imitations regarding tort 
actions and one would need to conaµlt the l aws ot the 
respective states.  
Some states continue to recogniZe the pr1nc1plea of 
sovex-e1gn immunity and charitable immunity which would pro­
vide the defense tor an action in tort on the part of the 
schools and/or school employees. These doctrines are fast 
disappearing, however, and upheld in only a small percentage 
or the courts . Chapter III discusses the principles ot 
sovereign immunity and charitable immunity 1n detail . 
Contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff 
may cause him to lose his case in a tort action. It is 
.. such negligence on the part of the plaintiff as to make 
the injury the result of the united, mutual, concurring 
and contemporaneous negligence ot t!·h1 partie s . "  73 When 
one ' s  own negligence contributes to his injury he cannot 
recover damages from the defendant . Bven though the defen­
dant waa negligent in his actions, there is a lack of due 
care on the part of the plaintiff whioh constitutes contribu­
tory negligence on the part of the injured plaintiff. The 
contributory negligence, however, muat be shown to be the 
- 73 
O. F. Shrofer, " Personal Liabilities of Industrial 
Arts Inatructora, Industrial Arts and Vocational Education, 
LIII, (November, 1964), p .  22. 
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proximate cause of the injury and either have caused the in­
jury or contributed to the negligence of the defendant to cause 
the 1nJury. 74 
Comparative negligence might be said to be an exten­
sion of the doctrine of contributory negligence, but it 
is not as widely acceptable and is available only in 
those states having specific statutes recognizing it.  
Comparative negligence exists when both parties have mu­
tually contributed to the injury and instead or the pla1n­
t 1f f being unable to recover damages from the defendant, 
both parties are apportioned for the damage s .  Damages 
are pro-rated on the amount or negligence attributed by 
each party on the basis of degrees of guilt . 75 The courts 
in the states recognizing contributory negligence feel 
that it is fairer to divide the damages between all the 
negligent parties, rather than having the plaintiff accept 
full responsibility and lose his claim. 
The doctrine of assumption or risk holds the belief 
that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed an obvious risk 
which was inherent in the type of activity in which he parti­
cipated. This kind or situat ion often occurs in the areas 
of athletics or sports-related activities . When the 
student knows that there is a possibil ity of an injury 
74 
Willis v .  Schlagenhauf, 188 A .  702 ( 1936 ) .  
75 
Grosso v .  Witteman, 62 N. w .  ( 2d )  386 ( 1954 ) .  
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occurring he 1a assumed to have realized the danger or 
riak and he knowingly and willingl7 enters into the acti­
vity. " Th• doctrine rests on two premises: First, that 
the nature and extent of the risk are fully appreciated; and 
second, that it is volunearilJ incurred." 76 There ia no 
l1abil1t1 where the risk is normal, but the burden ot proving 
asawapt1on of risk 11ea with the detendant. The court 1n 
H\µln v. Windaor Hotel also distinguished between the assump­
tion or risk doctrine and that ot contributorJ' negligence. 
A The doc�r1nea of contributory negligence and assumption 
or risk are not identical • • • • The essence of contributory 
negligence is carelessness; of aaaumpt1on of risk, ventur­
ousneaa. " 77 
Any case in tort involving negligence must go for 
its ultimate decision before a court of law and be decided 
upon by a Judge and a Jury. Every person is liable tor his 
own action• in the event or negligence and personal legal 
liability does exist for all cases or proven negligence. 
Negligence and liability for it should be the concern ot 
all guidance and student personnel workers. It adJudged 
negligent by the court in a tort action, the guidance and 
student personnel worker, or any other individual , races 
liability for damages attributed to his negligence. Liabi­
l ity for negligence results 1n a definite financial loss, 
76 
Hunn v. Windsor Hotel , 193 s. B. 57 (1937 ) .  
77 
Ibid • , p • 5 7. 
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and the guidance or student personnel worker must satisfy 
the•• Judgments and autter this loss himself. He can pro­
tect himaelt from this burden, through l iability insurance. 
Group or individual 1naurance ia available 1n ma� states 
to protect school employees trom the tinancial harshness 
that could be incurred from an action in tort for negli­
gence. It must be stated that l iability insurance does 
not attect the question ot liability, but merely provides 
for the payment or Judgments. The insurance does not constd­
tute a waiver or a tort action and cannot be used aa a defense 
for negligence .78 
Liability tor negligence can be avoided by the guid­
ance and student personnel worker by exercising due care 
and applying the standard of the reasonable man to all 
actions. It a cause or action should arise, certain defenses 
are available to all defendants 1n a negligence suit and 
these can be drawn upon by the guidance and student per­
sonnel worker. These include a denial of negligence, a 
missing element in a 1'ort action, an intervening cause, 
an act of God, the absence or foreseeability, a statute 
or l imitations, the doctrines or sovereign immunity and 
charitable immunity, contributory negligence, comparative 
negligence, and the assumption or riak. Liability is 
78 
Supler v. School District, 182 A {2d) 536 (1962 ) .  
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determined by a Judge and Jury and if round liable, the 
defendant must satisfy the Judgment from his own resources 
unless he has l iabil ity insurance . This insurance is 
available in moat states to all guidance and student 
personnel workers on an individual or group basis. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Thia paper has been an attempt to acquaint peraona 
•ho are engaged in the proteas1ons ot guidance and student 
personnel •ork •1th the la• of tort and l 1ab111t7 tor neg­
l igence in order that they may have a better understanding 
of the poaaible results of their negligent actions on both 
a personal and a proteaaional level. The status ot the 
guidance and student personnel •orker as a proteaaional 
has been establ ished and the history ot tort l iability for 
negligence haa been revietfed . Negl igence being the fail­
ure to act ae a reasonable and prudent man 1n a like or 
a 1m1lar circumstance provides one with a duty to exercise 
due care in all actions which could result 1n an injury to 
others . An individual who does not use prudence and take 
proper care 1a l iable for all injuries to others which are 
incurred aa a result of his negligence .  
Anyone 1a 1n a position to incur liabilit7. Liab111t7 
of all kinda baa been increasing over the 7eara, and al­
though the guidance and student personnel worker baa been 
involved 1n a relatively fe• number ot caaea to date, this 
does not insure him of freedom trom 1 1ab111t7. At one 
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time the guidance and student personnel worker might 
have come under the protection or the schools and school 
districts and might not have been subject to liability 
1n tort tor negligence by virtue or the sovereign immunity 
and charitable immunity doctrines, but the courts now feel 
that these doctrines are unfounded and that every person 
is liable in tort for his own negligence . The profesaional 
person in addition to exercising the ordinary standard of 
care of the reasonable and prudent man, must also meet the 
standard ot care of the reasonable and prudent prote�aional, 
and the profession itself must direct what that standard 
will be . Thus , the guidance and student personnel profes­
s ions should set up the standard of the reasonable and 
prudent guidance and personnel worker. To an extent this 
has been approached by the American Personnel and Guidance 
Aaaoc1at1on in its Code of Ethics . 
A number of defenses are available to a guidance and 
student personnel worker if he becomes involved in a to�t 
aet1on tor negligence. The circumstances surrounding each 
case will lead to 1ta determination of l iability. The 
alleged tacts of each cause of action must meet all the 
necessary elements or a tort action as well as the teat or 
toreaeeab111ty1 and theae facts must be brought before the 
court to be judged. It a court action ar1aea tor an individ­
ual, be he guidance or student personnel worker or ordinary 
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citizen, it can have serious repercusa1ons even though 
liability does not attach. Involvement 1n a court case 
can be costly in time, money and position whether or not 
the Judge and Jury have ruled in favor of the guidance or 
student personnel worker a.nd adjudged him liable or free 
from liability. 
The f 1nanc1al burden can be a heavy one &t one enters 
into a court case. One undergoes considerable expense in 
attorney' s  fees, costs for investigating the case, court 
costs, depositions and witness expenses without even con­
sidering the possibility of being adjudged liable. A lia­
bility ruling will also bring all the additional expenses 
of a retrial if an appeals case is initiated. It might be 
wise, financially, to obtain liability insurance, but it is 
necessary to keep 1n mind that this insurance covers only 
the legal Judgment. It does not always meet the other ex­
penses of a cause of action and 1t will never excuse liabi-
1 ity. 
Timewise, almost as much is expended as 1a involved 
financially. Time for meeting with lawyers, time tor 
collecting evidence, and time in court1 to say moth1ng of 
the time spent waiting for the actual trial to come before 
the courts provides the guidance or student personnel worker 
with an additional burden to his already busy schedules. 
The loaa or time and money is only a minor considera­
tion when one looks at the possible damage to the personal 
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and professional reputation of the guidance or student 
personnel worker who become8 involved in a tort action 
for negligence. An individual guidance or student per­
sonnel worker can discredit himself' and his s chool . Re­
gardless of the court ' s  dacis ion the tact that he was in 
any way involved in a cause of action for negl igence may 
forever remain in the minds ot others and be r1amag1ng to 
him as an individua l ,  as a school employee, and ae a mem­
ber o f  the guidance or student personnel profession. 
Since the profess ion has l ittle or no basis for tort 
liabil ity and almost no history of case law, attorneys 
special izing in the defense of guidance and student per­
sonnel workers involved in l iability ror negl igence are 
practically nonexistent . The ques t ion is how adequately 
will one be able to find a defense if a cause of action 
arise s .  As the profession continues to grow, so will the 
legal problems cont inue to increase , and the nurnber of 
opportunities for causes or sction in tort for negl iger,�e 
''.>J .�11 follow this sarne trend . Thie should not mean , however, 
that the guidance and student personnel worker need operate 
under the constant fear that a possibility of a court case 
for negligence will arise. His best defense will be to 
use prudence in all his activitie s ,  not only during the 
professional day, and to be informed about the law of tort 
and the actions or the court s .  
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Although there are meny demands on the t ime of the 
guidance and student per13onnel worker one needs to become 
acquainted with the entire area or legal 1mpl1ce.t1ons and 
consequences of the profess ion . In order to do this, more 
unity is needed among the profession to educate all its 
members regarding the leg2l problems of the profess ion and 
to 1n:tt1ate concern oveP the poss1b111t1es of court actions . 
To accomplish these objectives, it will be necessatttJ to 
analyze the constitutions and laws of the states regarding 
schools ,  to become familiar with judicial dec is ions �f­
fect1ng the guidance and student personnel worker ,  to re­
view the rules and regulations end the policies of the 
schools toward the prevention of poss ible causes of action, 
to attempt to legalize any and all defenses should a cause 
of act ion arise, and to influence the courts and legisla­
tures toward understanding the guidance and student person­
nel professions. There is no ev idence that the c�urts 
and legislatures have outwardly denied acceptance of t�e 
;:;uidance end �tudent personnel worker as a professional 
nor have they prohibited the legal protec t ion required by 
the profess ion, but it does seem necessary that the �embers 
organize themselves to insure their status. 
-
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